

Part 3 - Attack on 1st Battalion 32nd Infantry

Enemy probing attacks against 1/32 began about 2230 and continued for some time. The main attack commenced around midnight. It came right down the road between A and C Companies. One group then turned west behind A Company while another continued south to the A Company mortar position. Captain Ed Stamford, the Marine forward air controller, was in a bunker near the A Company CP. Chinese were on the bunker before he heard any firing on the front line. Stamford believed that the Chinese caught the security asleep. It was a perennial problem noted both before and after this event. Chinese pressure continued throughout the night. Local counterattacks were able to restore the lines in most places. But the most serious problem for 1/32 that night was the loss of a high point at the junction of C and B Company east of the road. The battalion was never able to regain that point. By daylight most of the battalions position had been restored except for the high ground between B and C Companies. Efforts to retake this position continued all day but without success.

Several Chinese prisoners were taken during the action. One of them said that the attack would envelop both sides of the Chosin reservoir. The following day Faith reported to General Almond that he had been attacked by elements of two Chinese divisions. Prisoners did identify the 80th CCF Division since that is the one Chinese division reported as being identified East of Chosin. But, since Faith indicated two Chinese divisions, forces attacking 1/32 must have included elements of the 81st as well.

Wire communication with the artillery went out about the time of the initial Chinese probing attacks. Radio contact was re-established some time later. Only then was it learned that the Inlet was under heavy attack and the artillery was busy defending itself and unable answer calls for fire. Col MacLean who had arrived earlier in the evening and remained the rest of the night was surprised by this.

In Company A there were eight men killed and twenty wounded. The number of casualties in the rest of the battalion is unknown, but it was reported that by afternoon at least a hundred men had passed through the aid station.¹

Attack at the Inlet

The Chinese attack at the Inlet came not long after midnight. An alert had been ordered earlier in the evening but nothing had developed. Then, firing was heard between the front line and a road block about two miles up the valley. Shortly thereafter the front lines were hit. The Chinese attack succeeded in penetrating and over-running K Company, part of I Company, the 81mm mortars and the battalion command post. Again circumstances indicated that security was not alert. The Chinese carried through to the positions of A Battery of the 57 FAB. The battery was eventually over-run with the infantrymen and artillerymen withdrawing to B Battery farther to the west where a stand was made which held for the rest of the night. In the midst of this a small group of M Company, the heavy weapons company, held out. With the exception of isolated hold-outs, the battalion had been penetrated and completely over-run.

Farther the south D Battery of the 5th AAA-AW Battalion, and the headquarters battery of the artillery had spent a quiet night, completely unaware of the attack until 0430 when they themselves came under attack. With no infantry protection only the tremendous killing power of the self propelled .50 caliber and 40mm anti-aircraft weapons held off the Chinese.

At sunrise the Chinese, fearful of air attack, withdrew. The 3rd Battalion was close to collapse. About ten o'clock the artillery headquarters battery and the AA battery moved into the perimeter. Pfc. James E. Blohm was a medic with headquarters battery. He described the scene as he arrived in the perimeter the morning of 28 November:

“The area was littered with bodies, Chinese and American. In the surprise attack many GI's had been bayoneted in their sleeping bags. After daylight, men and units were reorganized, and ammo taken from the dead was redistributed among the living....The perimeter was a scene from the pages of Dante's 'Inferno'. It was a chaos of scattered weapons and equipment; dead bodies, both Chinese and American; litter parties moving wounded to aid tents; litter parties moving the dead to a disposal area; wrecked vehicles; parked vehicles; officers and sergeants moving about in numbing cold of minus 30 degree below zero weather trying to create order out of chaos.”²

Captain McClymont, the AA battery commander, disposed his weapons at what appeared be the most logical positions to him. McClymont later said he never received any order on the disposition of his battery until the withdrawal started. The command situation at the Inlet remained confused during the day. The battalion commander, LtCol Reilly, had been wounded but was able sit up and talk. His executive officer had been wounded and other members of the battalion staff wounded or killed.

At Hudong

The 31st Medical Company arrived at Hudong about midnight on the 27th after an all day motor march. Anxious to reach the forward troops it pushed on. Approaching Hill 1221, about eight miles north of Hudong, it was ambushed. Casualties were heavy. Nearly all vehicles were lost. A few survivors trickled back to Hudong to report the attack. Some survivors were able to make it north to the Inlet.

In the early morning hours the staff at the rear CP received garbled reports of the action at Neidongjik and the Inlet but communication with the forward units soon deteriorated. About 0300 Major Lynch attempted to reach Col Paddock, the 7th Division G-3, on the SCR 193 radio. Instead General Barr came on and asked to speak to Gen. Hodes. As Hodes reported the conversation faded. RCT 31 never again had radio contact with the 7th Division.³ The rear CP continued to have wire communication with the 1st Marine Division CP at Hagaru-ri, and through the 1st Marine Division switchboard, with X Corps.

Day - 28 November

By daylight on the 28th the Chinese had effectively cut RCT 31 into three separate pieces. After spending the night at the 1/32 CP Col MacLean returned to his own forward CP about 0800. He told the staff members there he thought the 1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry, had come through the night in pretty good shape.⁴ Unaware of the situation at the Inlet he told his staff he intended to move his forward CP to the 3/31 area at the Inlet. In preparation for the move he sent his intelligence sergeant, Ivan Long, south to 3/31 with a small party. Long reached 3/31 under heavy fire, losing some men on the way.⁵ This was the first news the road between the two battalions was under fire. MacLean changed his mind about moving. Instead he moved his command post closer to 1/32. He did not yet know that the road was cut south of the Inlet.

At Hudong-ni Captain Drake, commander of the tank company, formed a provisional platoon of infantry from available troops, and, together with his tanks, led them forward toward Hill 1221 in an

attempt break through the Chinese block. General Hodes accompanied the improvised force. An all day effort failed to break through, leaving the Chinese in possession of the key hill. Drake withdrew late in the afternoon with the loss of four tanks. None of the forward units were aware of this attempt break through to them.

At 0950 Major Lynch phoned X Corps to report the forward units had been attacked, the Chinese had penetrated the artillery positions, the medical company had been ambushed, the tank company had moved out to attack, and that there was no wire communication with the forward units. He asked for ambulances for the wounded, for air on station, for improved communication, for an air drop of small arms ammunition to 1/32 and for liaison aircraft to direct artillery fire.⁶

By noon X Corps was well aware of RCT 31's situation. At 1120 LtCol Chiles, the Corps G-3, called the 7th Division, informed them of the RCT 31 situation and stated that the 2nd Battalion, 31 Infantry had been released as corps reserve and ordered rejoin the regiment without delay. The 2nd Battalion, having been halted at Hamhung as corps reserve, had late in the afternoon of the 27th, been ordered to move, at 0500 the next morning, to Majon-dong to block to the east.⁷ Now Chiles instructed Lt. Escue, RCT 31 liaison officer, to contact LtCol Richard R. Reidy and tell him to continue his move to the RCT 31 area at Chosin, not to stop at Majon-dong as previously ordered, that these were the instructions of the corps commander.⁸

Shortly after noon a liaison pilot from the 57th FA Battalion, in a flight arranged by corps artillery, was over the positions at the Inlet. He received, and relayed to X Corps a message saying all elements have been attacked, that ammunition and medical aid was needed. The pilot was also requested to locate any friendly tanks in the area and drop a message to them asking them to move forward.⁹

Almond visit

About 1400 General Almond flew to Hagaru-ri to confer with General Smith. He then borrowed a Marine helicopter and flew to MacLean's forward command post. Together Almond and MacLean jeeped forward to the 1/32 CP and conferred with Faith. Faith reported he had been attacked the previous evening by elements of two different Chinese divisions and that casualties had been fairly heavy. Records of the 7th Division indicate RCT 31 reporting contact with the 80th CCF Division, so Faith must have provided Almond and MacClean with that information. This would have been startling information, indicating not only a new division but a new three division Chinese army.

Almond refused believe the report. He told Faith, "That's impossible. There aren't two Chinese Communist divisions in the whole of North Korea," and added, "We're still attacking and going all the way the Yalu. Don't let a bunch of Chinese laundrymen stop you." Almond thought the Chinese who had attacked the previous night were part of the 124th, 125th and 126th CCF Division which had been delaying the advance for nearly a month, that the attack had been carried out by stragglers withdrawing northward.¹⁰

In discussion with MacLean it appears that both Almond and MacLean agreed that with the arrival of 2/31 and the tank company MacLean could get control of the situation and continue the advance. Almond's statements are difficult understand. He had been at Yudam-ni the previous day and was aware of the serious resistance met. By the morning of the 28th the Corps G-2 believed at least six CCF divisions with 35,000 men were in position to attack the corps.¹¹ Almond was also aware that the Chinese were attacking in strength all across the front of the Eighth Army and that II ROK Corps had folded. Almond hadn't left the corps CP until 1050. He would have had the reports of the heavy attacks at Yudam-ni and at RCT31. Col Chiles statement that the orders to 2/31 were those of the

corps commander would seem to indicate that Almond was aware of the RCT 31 situation, but perhaps not of its seriousness. Just before reaching RCT 31 he had been at the 1st Marine Division CP at Hagaru-ri. The Marines had identified four new Chinese divisions, the 58th, 59th, 60th, and 79th.¹² That information would have been provided him in any briefing. Given all this he certainly should have realized that a new situation, entirely different from his previous estimate, was developing. MacLean's upbeat assessment that 1/32 had come through in "pretty good shape" may have influenced his thinking although he may not have realized that MacLean had no idea of the violence of the attack at the Inlet or the ambush of the medical company.

Concluding his discussion with MacLean and Faith Almond announced that he had three Silver Stars to award. He had awarded three to the Marines the previous day and felt he needed to even things out with an award of three to Army units, including one to Faith himself. Irked by the capricious awards Faith called up a wounded platoon leader who happened to be nearby, and a mess sergeant who happened to be passing and ordered them to stand at attention to receive the awards. The ceremony completed Almond turned and left. Faith is reported to have ripped his from his chest and thrown it in the snow.

With the failure of the tank attack to clear the road to the Inlet General Hodes, still at Hudong, decided to go to Hagaru to seek help. About noon he departed in one of Captain Drake's tanks, both to insure that he would get through and to have communication with the rear CP through the tank radio net.¹³ Major Lynch and his operations sergeant followed later in a jeep. Although seeing Chinese on the hills they were not obstructed. At 1600 Lynch reported to corps that the situation with the cut off units was deteriorating and that they were badly in need of help. The battalions were holding their position but unable to get through to Hagaru. They had a considerable number of wounded and both TACPs were knocked out. He requested that 2/31 and the additional battery for the artillery be moved forward without delay. They also needed another air drop as only portions of the one delivered that day had been recovered.¹⁴

At Hagaru-ri General Hodes found there was little help to be had. The sole combat troops available to defend that vital center were two rifle companies, parts of the weapons companies of two different battalions and two artillery batteries. All available service troops, Army and Marine, were being pressed into infantry duties to man a perimeter more than 4,000 yards in circumference against a Chinese attack expected that night.

Night 28/29 November

At the inlet the Chinese forces, continuing to attack from the East, did not seem to press their attacks as hard. In addition, the Chinese had moved completely around to the south of the perimeter and had mounted several attacks from the west. One Chinese prisoner captured during the attack said that there were 4,000 Chinese surrounding the army forces and that their leaders had offered a great prize for each one of the anti-aircraft weapons captured or destroyed.

In the 1/32 perimeter enemy attacks resumed at dark. The attacking forces quickly penetrated the 1/32 lines in several places. The 1st Platoon of A Company was cut off. Because of the damage to the artillery at the Inlet Faith had to rely upon his own 81mm mortars and the heavy mortars for supporting fires, but several heavy mortars were out of action with their standards cracked or broke as a result of the high rate of fire together with the effect of cold in crystallizing the metal.¹⁵ About midnight MacLean authorized Faith to make his own decision to continue to hold or to fall back to the Inlet.¹⁶ With front line units hard pressed and ammunition beginning to run low Faith decided to withdraw. Hoping to reoccupy the positions the following day Faith had his motor officer disable any

vehicles left behind in a way that would permit them to be re-started. The withdrawal started about 0400. Vain attempts were made to reach the platoon of A Company which had been cut off in the Chinese attack. It was left behind as the troops moved off their positions. The Chinese did not seem to react to the withdrawal by pressing closely behind. By 0500 the battalion was on the road harassed only by intermittent fire until halted by a log barricade near the bridge leading across the Pungnyuri River into 3/31 positions.

Back at the Hudong CP LtCol Anderson called X Corps about 0400 and provided an update on the situation as he knew it. He reported that 3/31 had come under attack commencing at 1900 and the attack on 1/32 began about midnight. "All units received probing attack. Enemy buildup continues, including armor." He asked that the information be relayed to 7th Division and reported that he was in radio contact with both infantry battalions and the artillery but that physical contact had not been regained although attempts were being made regain this contact.¹⁷

Conference in Tokyo

While 1/32 was holding off the Chinese, 3/31 was fending off another attack at the Inlet, and 2/31 was trying to get to Chosin, vital decisions were being made in Tokyo. Returning to his CP in Hungnam on the afternoon of the 28th General Almond found a message directing him to report at once to Tokyo for a conference with Generals MacArthur and Walker. Almond departed Yonpo at 1700, arrived in Tokyo and went immediately to MacArthur's residence in the American Embassy where the others were awaiting his arrival. The conference began at 2130 and lasted until 0130. Present besides MacArthur, Walker and Almond were Admiral Turner Joy, General George E. Stratemeyer, General Doyle Hickey, the Far Eastern Command's acting chief of staff, General Wright the G-3, General Willoughby, the G-2, and General Courtney Whitney, MacArthur's military secretary.

The thrust of the discussion was what could X Corps do to assist Eighth Army. It was assumed, at that time, after three days of heavy fighting on the Eighth Army front, that Eighth Army was in greater danger than X Corps.¹⁸ When General Walker was asked for his estimate of the situation on his front and where he thought he could hold he replied that he thought he could hold Pyongyang and establish a line to the north and east of the city. Asked what he thought he could do help Walker Almond replied that he expected the Marines and the 7th Division to continue their attack west and north and carry out the plan to cut the enemy line of communication near Mupyong-ni and continue to the Yalu.

Almond's reply has always seemed startling in the face of the situation as it was known to them. The X Corps PIR for the 28 reported six CCF divisions totaling an estimated 35,000 men in the Chosin area.¹⁹ LtCol Glass from the X Corps G-2 section accompanied him to Tokyo and surely must have provided him with this information during the three and one half hour flight. Almond later explained his thinking: "I recall the gist of statements by Walker and myself. Neither one of us knew the strength of the Chinese. We stated so much. Walker thought he could hold his 'then' position ...we thought for a while it was possible for the Marine Division push forward to the northwest and thereby protect the flank of the Eighth Army ...two days earlier the G-2 of the 1st Marine Division did not give the enemy an offensive capability in the Chosin Reservoir area and that is the unit that had been in contact with what enemy forces had been discovered. The only reports that we received supported the probable presence of an unusually large number of enemy in the area which originated with local civilians whose reports had been exaggerated in all our other experiences...In view of the above I agreed that we could make an effort not knowing the enemy strength - the first thing do was 'try.' It must be remembered that the situation on the 1st Marine Division front was developing at the very time that we were conferring in Tokyo, and when I stated that the 1st Marine Division could assist I had done so with the possibility of an advance by the enemy coming on later."²⁰

Various measures to cope with the situation were discussed including an attack westward by the 3rd Division. Walker was anxious to be reinforced but he wanted the pressure kept on the Chinese who were on his right flank. MacArthur, apparently, made no decisions and issued no instructions when the meeting concluded at 0130. The next morning, MacArthur agreed with Walker's plan to defend Pyongyang, but authorized him to withdraw farther if he was in danger of envelopment. Almond was instructed to concentrate X Corps at Hungnam.²¹

Almond departed Tokyo at noon the next day, arriving back at Yonpo at 1710 having been kept away from his command for 24 hours. In that time the situation had crystallized.

Day - 29 November

When his battalion reached the obstacles blocking the road north of the bridge over the inlet, Faith sent two rifle companies up over the hill to the left (east) to envelop the Chinese defending the block. By the time the companies were in position the Chinese had withdrawn, but the bridge was covered by long range fire. With the reduction of the road block the troops started across the ice while vehicles prepared to run for it across the bridge.

As troops prepared to cross the ice Col MacLean observed a column of troops approaching the 3/31 perimeter along the road from the southwest. Troops in the perimeter were starting to fire on the advancing column while the troops in the column returned the fire. MacLean believed that the advancing column was the 2nd Battalion, 31st Infantry whose arrival he was expecting. Fearing a bloody clash between two of his units he shouted, "Those are my boys, " and started across the ice to halt the firing. He was seen to be hit and fall several times, then disappeared in the brush on the far side of the inlet. He was not seen again by friendly troops. It was learned later that MacLean had been captured by the Chinese and died of his wounds on the road north to prison camp. MacLean was the highest ranking Army officer be killed inaction in Korea.

By 0900 troops from 1/32 were crossing the inlet to the 3/31 perimeter and by noon all had closed in the perimeter. The scene at the Inlet made an indelible impression on those who witnessed it. Major Robins, S-1 of the 31st Infantry, who had accompanied MacLean, described it:

"One had only to look about ... to confirm everything... Dead and wounded GIs lay in and around the Korean mud house that served as a CP and just a few yards beyond I counted twenty dead Chinese in their now familiar quilted jackets and tennis shoes. In fact they were strewn throughout the area giving evidence of their penetration into the very foxholes of the beleaguered battalion and its command post...a scene of destruction. It had been effectively 'reduced' and was offering no organized resistance. There was smoke, fog and very limited visibility."²²

Captain Erwin D. Bigger, who commanded the heavy weapons company in 1/32, also described the scene:

".....we could look across the ice and see that the 3rd Bn, 31st and 57 FA were heavily engaged. Chinese were pouring down the surrounding hill toward the perimeter of the units. The quad 50 machine guns and the dual 40 mm anti-aircraft weapons of the 57th FA were taking a heavy toll of the Chinese columns....it was about that time we observed a column of troops approaching the perimeter of the 31st from the south along the road."²³

Ed Stamford the forward air controller reported, "The dead were everywhere when we joined them."

Stamford said he saw dead in their sleeping bags. Bigger also reported that "...in the 31st Infantry and 57th FA ...many men were killed by the Chinese as they slept in their bedrolls." Pictures taken by Ivan Long and others confirm the desolation of the scene.

With MacLean missing and Reilly wounded Faith assumed command of the task force. He, Miller and Curtis spent the remainder of the morning "...trying find out what was left of Companies I and K of the 31st. There was no L left." The perimeter was reorganized and consolidated. A search of the area along the edge of the reservoir revealed no trace of Col MacLean.

During the day two air drops were received but were only partially successful. Some of the material fell outside the lines. Units remained short of ammunition. No 40mm ammunition was received then or later, and only about 40 rounds of 105mm ammunition received. The 40mm ammunition was delivered to the Hudong CP instead of the 75mm ammunition Drake had requested. About 1600 an evacuation helicopter, arranged by General Hodes, arrived. The first two evacuees taken out were Lieutenant Colonels Reilly and Embree, both wounded the first night. The helicopter returned later take out two more wounded, but that was all.

At Hudong Captain Drake organized another larger provisional rifle company and attempted another attack to open the road. This one also failed. At 1745 Anderson, from Hudong, reported the failure of the tank attack and stated that he now had communication with the forward elements through artillery air liaison planes when the planes were in the air.²⁴

Back at Hamhung the 2/31, now received still newer instructions. The battalion was to proceed to Majondong on the 29th where trucks would pick them up. They were then to proceed north, clear the MSR and rejoin the 31st Infantry east of the Chosin Reservoir. Clearing the MSR would involve clearing the road between Koto-ri and Hagaru-ri as well as the road between Hagaru-ri and the Inlet. Obediently the battalion had closed on Majon-dong by road and rail at 1015. By noon the trucks had not arrived. The battalion S-3 called X Corps and was told they were familiar with the situation and were working on it. Half an hour later LtCol Fairchild, a X Corps staff officer arrived to find out why trucks were not there. Informed of the situation he went north looking for the trucks. At 1700 he returned to the battalion and reported that the trucks, loaded with ammunition, had gone north through Majon-dong that morning. They were to have stopped, unloaded the ammunition and loaded the battalion. Later that evening X Corps reported that trucks would be available the following morning at 0630. The mission had not changed: clear the MSR and rejoin the 31 Infantry.²⁵

Chinese shift main effort

On the 29th of November, after two days of fighting, General Song Shilun and his staff re-appraised the situation. They believed the forces at Yudam-ni were the 7th Marines and two battalions of the 5th Marines. They estimated that the forces at Sinhung-ni, East of Chosin, consisted of the 32nd Infantry Regiment with one battalion of the 31st, plus one artillery battalion. At Hagaru they thought there was one battalion of the 5th Marines, one tank battalion, and the headquarters of the 1st Marine Division. They estimated the forces at Sachang-ni to be the 7th Infantry Regiment. Thus they believed the total enemy strength surrounded at Yudam-ni, Hagaru and East of Chosin to be four regiments, one tank battalion and three artillery battalions, over 10,000 men. This was twice the enemy strength anticipated in their original plan.

Song Shilun decided on a change. Instead making his main effort against 1st Marine Division forces at Yudam-ni he would concentrate additional forces to destroy the army units at Sinhung-ni. Thereafter he would shift his troops to destroy the units at Yudam-ni and Hagaru one after the other.

The 27th Army would move the remainder of the 81st CCF Division, two regiments in the Fusen Reservoir area, to join the 80th Division in the attack at Sinhung-ni. The 27th Army's reserve division, the 94th, would be prepared to assist.²⁶

New Orders

At Koto-ri, in addition to the troops assigned to defense of the town, were G Company, 1st Marines, B Company, 31 Infantry, a company of Marine tanks, the 41 Independent Commando, and various troops from the division headquarters and signal battalions. In urgent need of additional forces to defend Hagaru General Smith ordered them formed into a task force under Lieutenant Colonel Drysdale, the commando commander, to clear the road and advance to Hagaru. Moving north the force was halted by heavy Chinese fire several miles north of Koto-ri. Drysdale reported the situation and asked for instructions. He was ordered to proceed if at all possible. In the ensuing advance the task force was split by the Chinese. G Company, most of the Commandos, some of the tanks and a few of the service troops reached Hagaru-ri. Other portions of the task force were able return Hagaru while others were taken prisoner, all with heavy casualties.

That evening at 2050 General Almond, having returned from Tokyo, ordered all Army forces from Koto-ri north attached the 1st Marine Division, including RCT 31. Responsibility for RCT 31 now was assigned the 1st Marine Division. The order also instructed the 1st Marine Division to redeploy one RCT immediately from Yudam-ni to Hagaru to be employed in regaining contact with RCT 31.²⁷ Inasmuch as the 59th CCF Division was deployed across the road south of Yudam-ni, the 79th CCF Divisions north of Yudam-ni, portions of the 89th west of Yudam-ni and the 58th around Hagaru-ri, carrying out the latter portion of the corps order would take some time.

1. Appleman *East of Chosin* p 77

2. Blohm, James E. in *Faces of War* p 125

3. Appleman *East of Chosin* p87 and N34.

4. Ibid p 99

5. Long narrative in *Faces of War* p 123

6. X Corps - 0950 J-27

7. 7th Division Units at Chosin

8. X Corps - J-36 1120. There is some discrepancy or time lag here. 7th Division Units at Chosin stated that it was only at 1700 that afternoon that 2/31 received instructions, and those from LtCol Milburn of the corps G-3 section, to move on the 29th to Majon-dong and block to the east. It was later that evening the instructions were amended to move to Majon-dong in the morning by rail and organic vehicle, then board trucks to be provided by X Corps to move to Chosin.

9. X Corps G-3 Journal J-27 28 Nov 50

10. Hammel *Chosin* p137

11. X Corps PIR 63 28 Nov
12. *An Evaluation of the Influence of Marine Corps Forces in the Course of the Korean War (4Aug50-15Dec50)* 2. vols. U. S. Marine Corps Board 1952 II-C-66
13. Appleman *East of Chosin* p 115
14. X Corps G-3 Journal J-76 1600
15. Curtis MSS
16. Ibid. Accounts differ. Curtis, who was present, says that MacLean left the decision up to Faith. Miller believes that MacLean made the decision himself.
17. X Corps G-3 Journal J-6 0315 29 Nov
18. Schnabel, James F. *Policy and Direction: The First Year*. Washington: Center of Military History, U. S. Army. 1988 p 279 - No record was kept of this meeting. General Whitney later included a brief account in his book. The substance of the meeting has been reconstructed from Whitney, from messages sent X Corps later, and from Appleman's later interviews and correspondence with General Almond.
19. X Corps PIR 63 28 Nov 50
20. Ltr Almond to Appleman 21 Dec 76 - MHI
21. Appleman *Disaster in Korea* p 216. Almond's recollection is somewhat different. At the conclusion of the meeting Walker felt he could shore up the line and hold along the Chongchon while he, Almond would reinforce units at Chosin with 7th Div units, maintaining "aggressive contract" as a last resort fall back to Hamhung- Hungnam. Ltr Almond to Appleman 21 Dec 76 - MHI
22. Appleman *East of Chosin* p 147ff.
23. Ibid
24. X Corps G-3 Journal J-72 1745 29 Nov
25. 7th Division Units at Chosin
26. Chinese Academy of Military Science. *The War History of the Chinese People's Volunteers in the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea* . Beijing: Military Science Press, 1988. Partial translation in author's possession.
27. X Corps OI 19 292046 Nov